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1. General principles 
In order to declare a State aid1 as incompatible with EU law, it is 
necessary that the measure is referred to the State (subjective profile) and 
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financed, directly or indirectly, through State resources, has to produce a 
selective economic advantage to the beneficiary, distorts or threatens to 
distort competition and, ultimately, hinders intra-Community trade 
(criterion of the sensitive effect). 
State aid is not to be considered as a measure totally hostile to 
competition because of the derogations provided for by the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union which allows, after assessing its 
possible compensatory justification, the authorization of the aid scheme. 
The discretion of the Commission shows itself in all its breadth, 
especially when the assessment is based on an economic nature.  
In this regard, it can be pointed out that, in the light of the principle of 
the private investor in a market economy2, it is supposed that there is a 
suspected State aid in the event that no rational justifications give good 
reason for the allocation of public resources, which implies, 
consequently, that the examination must be conducted on the basis of 
the same parameters that would use, in fact, a private investor. 
                                                                                                                            
(eds.), Aiuti di Stato fiscali e giurisdizioni nazionali: problemi attuali. Atti e documenti del progetto 
di formazione e ricerca National Tax Judges and Fiscal State Aids, Bari, 2015; C.E. BALDI, La 
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To identify the existence of a prohibited aid pursuant to art. 107, §1, 
TFEU, in addition to the advantage determined in favour of the 
beneficiary undertakings , apart from its form (which refers to a very 
broad type of aid, including grants, loan guarantees, reductions in the tax 
burden, total or partial reduction of the amount of tax, such as 
exemption or tax credit, deferment or renegotiation of tax debt, granting 
of public land, cross-subsidization, etc.), further elements must also be 
recognized, among which the substantial indifference as to the origin of 
the measure, favouring in a specific way certain undertakings or 
productive sectors (selectivity criterion) and, finally, affect trade between 
Member States and be able to provoke potentially distorting effects of 
the competition. 
Imputability3.Any measure whose nature appears to be originally as public 
determines its status as State aid. For example, it is considered to be part 
of the “public sector” an “institution established by the law of a Member 
State as a special institution under the supervision and guarantee of the 
legislative authority”. The presence of the State in the economy, in its 
capacity as owner or controller of undertakings operating in the market, 
is one of the most sensitive factors checked by the Commission.  
                                                     
3 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission (Stardust), C-
482/99, paragraphs 55 and 56; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 October 2014, 
Commerz Nederland, C-242/13, paragraph 35. 
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State resource4. The notion of “state resource” does not refer exclusively to 
financial management but also to any assets and liabilities on public 
accounts. Likewise, a State measure, although not an incentive payment, 
can have effects on asset management mitigating, for example, the flow 
of public revenues not attributable to taxes. This means that the actions 
of the State affect its assets, confirming the orientation of the 
relevance/prevalence of the effects of the measure as a potential 
distorting element of the market. State resources, therefore, is certainly 
what comes, directly or indirectly, from public finance (the burden on 
the budget), without excluding the measures that can produce, even 
potentially, distorting repercussions on competition and on public 
interest, which, in these circumstances, can conflict with the law of the 
Union.   
State aid intervention can be classified as abnormal if it results from the 
application of derogation from a general provision. 
Selectivity5. One of the most important criterion significantly rises: 
selectivity. Partial exemption from the payment of certain social security 
                                                     
4 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 January 1978, Van Tiggele, 82/77, paragraphs 
25 and 26; Judgment of the General Court of 12 December 1996, Air France v. 
Commission, T-358/94, paragraph 63;  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2003, 
Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v Commission, Joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00, 
paragraphs 33 and 34; Judgment of the General Court of 4 July 2007, Bouygues SA v. 
Commission, T-475/04. 
5 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 June 1999, DMTransport, C-256/97, paragraph 
27; Judgment of the General Court of 6 March 2002, Territorio Histórico de Álava — 
Diputación Foral de Álava et aL. v Commission, Joined Cases T-127/99, T-129/99 and T-
148/99, paragraph 149; Judgment of the General Court of 29 September 2000, 
Confederación Espanola de Transporte de Mercancías v Commission, T-55/99, paragraph 40; 
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contributions for undertakings in a given industrial sector is considered 
as aid because the referred measure allows beneficiaries to derogate from 
a general rule.  
In this sense, the measure can be qualified as selective because it is aimed 
at favouring a given economic sector. Ultimately, it is the derogation 
from a general rule that integrates the selectivity of the aid, which is 
precisely because it is abnormally granted by the public authority.  
The Commission has, moreover, mitigated the narrow scope of 
application of this rule by specifying how such a derogation could 
possibly be admitted, particularly in tax matters, if it is justified by 
economic rationality so as to make it necessary or functional with respect to 
the effectiveness of the system6. 
As already made clear by the Court of Justice7, however, the contribution 
must have a horizontal nature and be based on objective elements, such 
as, for example, the unlimited duration and the wide scope of 
implementation. This conclusion also appears to be consistent with the 
principle of equality, according to which measures derogating from the 
formal equality criterion may be admitted, proving that the derogation is 
justified by the general objectives of the legal system and does not 
conflict with the system where it is applied (for example, tax ruling).  
                                                                                                                            
Judgment of the General Court of 13 September 2012, Italy v Commission, T-379/09, 
paragraph 47. 
6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 July 1974, Italy v. Commission, C-173/73. 
7 Judgment of the Court of  Justice of 2 July 1974, Italy v. Commission, C-173/73. 
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An additional indicative criterion of the presence of public aid in 
contrast with the internal market rules is then identified in the impact of 
the measure «on trade between Member States»8. In order to be able to 
ascertain the impact on trade it is necessary to verify whether the 
incentives have, first of all, national relevance (thus being able to exclude 
incompatibility) and, subsequently, if there are undertakings in the aided 
“sector” already operating under competition. Both the conditions 
mentioned above must be satisfied: the effects provoked by the aid on a 
community basis and the existence of a competitive market in the sector 
in which the aided enterprise is located. The Court of Justice, in fact, 
considers aid to be a financial intervention granted by the State to the 
undertaking which strengthens its position in the market at the expense 
of other competitors of the latter in intra-Community trade9. It is not, 
however, excluded that a measure to encourage exports to third 
countries could concretely threaten competition in the internal market 10. 
If public aid were granted to support business ventures abroad, the 
assessment of the impact on trade should therefore be carried out by 
assessing its sustainability in the reference market, in particular taking into 
account the situation at the time the benefit was granted. This means 
that subsidized goods trades, which are not subject to import or export 
                                                     
8 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 September 2000, C-156/98, Germany v. 
Commission, in Racc., I-6857 ss. 
9 Judgment of the General Court of  del 17 September 1980, Philip Morris Holland BV v 
Commission, C-730/79, in Racc., 2671. 
10 Judgment of the General Court of  21 March 1990, Belgium v Commission, C-142/87, 
in Racc., I-961. 
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flows within the European Union, do not constitute aid. The criterion 
that can be deduced from the previous considerations can therefore be 
defined as the above mentioned sensitive effect. This criterion must be 
considered as a reference point for all those situations, legally 
determined, which operate ad excludendum with respect to the prohibition 
of granting State aid.  
For example, the de minimis non curat praetor principle (which allows for 
the granting of a small amount of financial benefit), being mainly aimed 
at supporting small and medium-sized undertakings, allows both the 
exclusion from the quantitative compatibility check, as the effects of 
economic assistance do not threaten (at least prima facie) distorting 
competition, and the removal from the obligation of prior notification to 
the Commission, which admits, in this case, a presumption of 
compatibility with the internal market, although the Courts decisions 
have not totally ruled out that aid deemed to be of negligible size is 
capable of distorting, even potentially, intra-Community competition. 
The minimum threshold would serve to return to the State certain forms 
of intervention in the economy. The equalizing function of the State 
with respect to serious situations of economic and social disadvantage 
remains an evaluation parameter left to the Community bodies because it 
is better not to leave self-regulatory tasks to the States in a sector such as 
public aid, naturally exposed to the interference of political bodies. 
Consequently, even setting the minimum parameters for granting the aid, 
while appearing as a sort of political guarantee aimed at the individual 
States for the recovery of its reference values, should instead be framed 
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as a mere attribution of residual powers in favour of institutions 
providing public subsidies to businesses.  
 
2. Eligible aids 
Eligible aids are subdivided into two major categories: those compatible by 
law and discretionary ones (only if the market disruption hypothesis is 
excluded11). 
A) The ipso iure compatible aids are listed in art. 107, §2, TFEU and 
concern social aids granted to individual consumers, provided that they 
are granted without discrimination determined by the origin of the 
products; aid intended to remedy damage caused by natural disasters or 
other exceptional events; the support measures for the areas of federal 
Germany that are affected by the previous territorial division. 
With regard to the cases listed above, the Commission has no 
discretionary power, at least in the first instance; in fact, it may carry out 
subsequent checks on the correspondence of the measures adopted with 
the aforementioned provision. However, the notification of the aid is 
required in order to allow the Commission to verify that the 
implementation of the measure is not carried out in an irregular way. 
B) In applying the derogations, the Treaty gives the Commission a broad 
and necessary discretion to ensure functionality for the techniques of 
pursuing the objectives of the internal market and the more general 
                                                     
11 A. EVANS, Law, Policy and Equality in the European Union: the Example of State Aid 
Control, in Economic Law Review, 1998, 438-439. 
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policy of common interests. The derogatory system gives, in reality, a 
certain flexibility to the legislation, since the device constituted by the 
rules of the Treaty leaves to the Council or the Commission the task, 
according to the cases, to rule on the compatibility of any aid or category 
of aid, in relation to the stated criteria, under the control of the Court of 
Justice. 
While in the assessment of the conditions that satisfy the application of 
art. 107, §1, TFEU, the Commission operates, in principle, through 
criteria, so to say negative, the compatibility of the aid subject to the 
derogation, instead, it is assessed on the basis of the “case by case” 
examination, on the basis both to the substantial legislation and to 
situations of fact such as, for example, the economic situation or the 
gross domestic product / purchasing power standard. 
The so-called discretionary aids, for which there is a prior notification 
obligation, concerns: aid to promote the economic development of 
regions where the standard of living is abnormally low, or there is a 
serious form of underemployment, as well as of the regions referred to 
in art. 349 of the Treaty of Lisbon, taking into account their structural, 
economic and social situation; aid to promote the execution of an 
important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; aid to facilitate the 
development of certain activities or of certain economic regions, 
provided that they do not alter the conditions of trade to an extent 
contrary to the common interest, aid to promote culture and heritage 
conservation, when they do not alter the conditions of trade and 
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competition in the Union to an extent contrary to the common interest; 
the other categories of aid, determined by a Council decision, on a 
proposal from the Commission. 
It should be stated that the list of potentially eligible aid contained in art. 
107, §3, TFEU, does not bind the scrutiny powers of the Commission, 
preserving its wide margin of discretion. The derogation from the 
principle of incompatibility is justified on the basis of the balance 
between the Community interest and the internal one. State aid must be 
granted not only for purposes of interest, so to speak, domestic, whose 
motivation is the basis of any aid measure, but must also contain 
elements enabling a test to carry out possible positive effects for the 
Union as a whole. 
It is therefore a very important task for the Commission because it 
indirectly deals with the areas within which the States can legitimately 
perform their economic incentive activity. The Community institution 
therefore acts as a synthesis between the objective of the Member State 
and the harmonious economic expansion of the Union. Thus, for 
example, the classification of national aid in the dimension of the 
principle of economic and social cohesion allows the Commission to 
assess the State aid measure within the more general objectives of the 
Union, “opening up”, in favour of the Member States, operating margins 
from the point of view of their economic policy, particularly in the 
direction of support for depressed areas. 
The norm is inspired by the criterion pursuant to art. 107, §3, b), TFEU, 
which acknowledges the compatibility of an important European project 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State aid law: general outlines 
48 
 
of common interest, clearly showing the will of the European Union 
both of the maintenance of a “common” political line and of the 
manifest hostility to the “big” (“important”) investment projects that 
may threaten to distort free competition. This fee can also be identified 
in the provision contained in art. 107, §3, c), TFEU, where it is 
established that the measure intended «to facilitate the development of 
certain activities or of certain economic regions' may be considered 
eligible, provided that it does not alter 'the conditions of trade to an 
extent contrary to the common interest». 
The assessment concerning the purpose of Community interest is 
particularly incisive in the case of regional aid. For this typology, the 
Treaty governs two hypotheses: the first concerns «aid to promote the 
economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment» [art. 107, 
§3, a), TFEU]; the second relates to «aid to facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aids 
does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest» [art. 107, §3, c), TFEU]. 
It should be noted that the State assumes, among the criteria of 
qualification of its action, that of the rebalancing of any differential 
situations of development in the national territory and that, for the 
purposes of rationalization in the use of public resources, of the 
equalization between the territories of the State with respect to the 
overuse and underuse of human, territorial and environmental resources. 
It is precisely with regard to these considerations that the European 
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Union itself believes that a territorially oriented aid policy is «one of the 
indispensable instruments of balanced regional development». 
Pursuant to art. 107, §3, a) and c), TFEU may be regarded as 
«compatible with the common market for State aid granted to promote 
the economic development of certain less-favoured areas within the 
European Union». This is «investment aid for large undertakings  or, in 
certain particular circumstances, for operating aid, in both cases destined 
to specific regions in order to rebalance regional disparities». The 
fundamental aim of these aids is to promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, «support for investment and job creation and the 
expansion and diversification of economic activities of undertakings 
located in the most disadvantaged regions». 
In this respect, it is necessary to make the granting of such aid 
conditional on the maintenance of a minimum period of investments 
and jobs created in the less-favoured region' and to allow operating aid 
only in exceptional cases of structural delays in the regions. Community 
interest is protected only if such aid is «used sparingly and if it remains 
concentrated in the most disadvantaged regions». 
The conditions for granting the derogation must, on the one hand, also 
concern the objective of the common interest, on the other, concerning 
situations such as to suggest to the Community institution that the 
distortions of competition are justified by reasons, for example, of 
structural retardation, for instance from needs connected to the increase 
in jobs and, furthermore, from a coherent sectorial development policy.  
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The derogation therefore stands as a point of equilibrium between the 
distortions of competition (if any) caused by the aid and the 
development of the less favoured regions, even if, precisely by virtue of 
the control instruments on regional aid, marked, indeed, by elements of 
«extreme obstinacy and dogmatism», most of the economic support 
actions for the development of disadvantaged areas are deeply 
conditioned. 
 
3. The economic and financial crisis 
The economic and financial crisis has put a strain on the system of rules 
on state aid, especially in the financial sector. It is known that the State 
aid intervention through the use of economic incentives is not 
considered as the ideal remedy for any crisis because it would risk 
producing sterilization of competition in other sectors.  
Nevertheless, one of the first initiative taken by the “European” 
authorities was to allow member States to admit support measures to 
help undertakings hit by the crises, without compromising the given 
regulatory framework12. 
In the immediacy of the explosion of the crisis, some governments 
suggested a sort of general suspension of the provisions on aid, for 
which an unanimous decision of the Council, however, would have been 
required pursuant to art. 108, §2, TFEU, perhaps interpreting the 
                                                     
12 C. BRADLEY, Transparency and Financial Regulation in the European Union: Crisis and 
Complexity, in Fordham International Law Review, 2012, 1197 
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exceptions system set out in Article 107, §3 TFEU in an excessively 
extensive way, considering the possible granting of the measure as a 
consequence of a «serious disturbance in the economy». 
The Commission has preferred to envisage a series of actions in order to 
make aid «less numerous and more targeted», as advocated in the Action 
Plan of 7 June 2015, including the disincentive allocation of harmful aid 
and its simultaneous reorientation towards horizontal objectives, the 
modernization of control procedures also through closer collaboration 
with the States and the consolidation of the role of the national judge, as 
well as the encouragement of the appeal of private enforcement by 
individuals injured by the violation of state aid rules.  
It was thought that the over twenty hypotheses of exemption from prior 
notification (as aids deemed compatible) provided by regulation n. 800 
of 200813 would have nullified the control by the Commission, especially 
in light of the use of the criterion of the necessity of the aid.  
The apparently less intransigent control, in any case calculated, of the 
Commission, far from being oriented towards the abdication of its 
supervisory role on the rules of the Treaty, moves in the direction of a 
reconsideration of the policy of granting aid.  
Anyway, the State can nevertheless represents a factor of development 
and economic growth, also in implementing the aforementioned 
principle of economic social and territorial cohesion. 
                                                     
13 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block 
exemption Regulation), OJ L 214, 9.8.2008. 
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Above all, the exemption from prior notification for certain categories of 
aid presupposes an upstream assessment that made it possible to 
ascertain its substantial compatibility with EU law, for instance the non-
impact on competition.  
Furthermore, the exemption regulation functions as an indirect 
instrument to support the economy, without prejudice to the powers of 
the Commission, which can rely on all its “strength” regulates in detail 
the cases, not a few, of inapplicability of the system of exemptions by 
category. 
It should not be forgotten that the basic objective of the control action 
carried out by the Commission remains to put in place every useful and 
appropriate instrument that discourages initiatives aimed at 
surreptitiously strengthening the enterprise's economic capacity to the 
detriment of its European competitors.  
In this delicate phase characterized by a persistent instability, there were 
no lack of lightening of the aforementioned screening, obviously under 
certain conditions. For example, in 2008 the Commission issued a 
Communication in which it indicated some possible remedies to meet 
the needs of the States wishing to adopt measures to support the 
economy14. The document itself, an indicator of a political orientation, 
has acted as a trailblazer to allow States to adopt transitory and 
                                                     
14 Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270, 
25.10.2008. 
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exceptional measures aimed at tackling the difficulties deriving from the 
particular economic contingency. 
One of the first measures taken by the Union authorities after the 
explosion of the crisis, in any case, was precisely to allow the States a 
certain, albeit limited, margin in preparing business support measures, 
without compromising the general regulatory framework.  
So the quaestio is not to evoke conflicts between neutral (liberal) state and 
welfare state, but to seek feasible solutions, taken quickly and with 
immediate effect, in accordance with the current legal order, to try to get 
out of the anticyclical development. 
For this reason, it has become necessary, in general, to speed up certain 
decision-making processes: it is enough to turn the attention, for 
example, to the new temporary arrangements issued in the context of the 
initiatives to combat the crisis, which assign to the Commissioner for 
competition the power to approve aid measures very quickly in order to 
respond quickly to the needs of economic operators in difficulty; at the 
same time, a more collaborative phase was started with the Member 
States as regards the pre-notification phase in order to allow greater 
inter-institutional cooperation both to facilitate decision-making and to 
analyse the subsidy, also to avoid that states may incur subsequent 
negative assessments and, therefore, even more damaging to the 
beneficiaries, who, in the case of the declaration of incompatibility, are 
obliged to repay what has been illegitimately obtained. 
After a first phase, coinciding with the explosion of the economic crisis, 
the Commission assessed the aid to banks (granted in the form of a 
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deposit guarantee, opening of lines of credit, guarantees on the emissions 
of vehicle undertakings, capital injections) the legislation concerning 
undertakings in difficulty using the one-off aid criterion and adopted a 
series of communications relating to the banking sector in order to make 
its position known, given the continuation of the financial crisis. The 
legal basis for the compatibility assessment is anchored to art. 107, §3, b), 
TFEU (to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy).  
Subsequently, an organic regulation was introduced, partially integrating 
the previous communications15, through the Communication of the 
Commission of 30 July 2013 on the application, from 1 August 2013, of 
the rules on state aid to measures to support banks in the context of 
financial crisis, (2013 / C 216/01). 
 
4. The General Block Exemption Regulation 
Member States and the Commission, while remaining distant as to the 
finalistic reasons that move their respective activities, may be have found 
a point of convergence in considering as possible, say compatible, certain 
forms of intervention in the economy: the formers, having to confront 
the internal social problems; the second, no longer deaf facing the 
European social question.  
                                                     
15 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (“Banking Communication”), 
OJ C 216, 30.7.2013. 
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This scenario includes the new provisions of the General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER)16 concerning State aid exempted from 
prior notification, provisions which, at least in terms of intentions, could 
give back “power” to the State as an economic actor.  
It must be added the reform of the procedural regulation and the new 
rules for rescue and restructuring aid, with particular reference to banks, 
prime recipients of substantial aid contributions in terms of cash flow 
that, in a certain way, have produced a freezing effect, even if temporary, 
of the systemic crisis, and to industries. 
Looking at the total amount of aid granted in 2011, it is noted that 13% 
refers to individual aid, 32% to those exempted and the remaining 55% 
to aid schemes, while 14% of aid is for individual aid, 63% for exempted 
aid and 23% for individual aid. These data indicate that the percentage of 
aid granted without notification has grown enormously over the last few 
years demonstrating a progressive responsibility on the part of the States 
that have chosen to plan support measures by making use of the 
legislation that allows the implementation of measures of subsidy - that is 
incentive policies - which potentially do not hinder intra-Community 
competition. It is estimated, for the 2014-2020 period, that 66% of the 
total amount of aid and 75% of the measures could be extended in the 
light of the new rules contained in the GBER. On a practical level, this 
                                                     
16 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty. 
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trend will make it possible to shift the effects of controlling a substantial 
amount of aid from the Commission to the Member States17. 
A larger amount of aid subject to State “liability” should be realized.  
This regulation is strictly connected to that of the Structural Funds 
programming, in order to facilitate and channel information flows 
between the Commission and the States (in this case the regional 
autonomies), to monitor the amount of individual support actions, to 
identify and resolve issues stemming from administrative and 
organizational problems and to propose, if necessary, recommendations 
to individual Member States in the context of the European Semester. 
In this way, state policies can be addressed in specific sectors and 
activities to which it is considered necessary to focus more attention, in a 
more favourable regulatory context characterized by the simplification 
and improvement of the procedural rules. 
As for the process of simplification of the rules, GBER makes it easier 
to control the effects of the incentive and the proportionality of the 
measure, increases transparency and allows a more accurate assessment 
of broader aid systems. 
The regulation in question does not apply, inter alia, to fishery and 
aquaculture aid –  which is the subject of specific regulations – to certain 
activities connected to exports, to aids in agricultural products and to 
                                                     
17 Commission Staff Working Paper – Autumn 2012 Update {COM(2012) 778 final} – Facts 
and figures on State aid in the EU Member States, Accompanying the document State Aid 
Scoreboard 2012 Update – Report on State aid granted by the EU Member States, Brussels, 
12/12/ 2012, SEC(2012) 443, final. 
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those linked to the closure of uncompetitive coal mines and certain 
categories of regional aids such as those provided for steel, coal, 
shipbuilding, synthetic fibers, transport and related infrastructure sectors, 
production and distribution of energy and energy infrastructure, and so 
forth. 
On a general level, in any case, the GBER should not generate much an 
enthusiastic feeling, taking into account the general framework on State 
aid, which, in fact, does not change its substantive elements, placing itself 
in line with the previous control activity carried out by the Commission. 
It is enough to consider the common interest, a criterion that must inspire 
the domestic action or the incentive character possessed by the support 
measure. This criterion, well known in the application of the rules on the 
subject of State aids, involves evaluations not divorced from political 
opportunity and close economic analysis.  
As far as ad hoc aid is concerned, moreover, the State must have 
previously verified that the documentation submitted contains the proof 
that at least one of the following results has been achieved.  
A) The case of regional investment aid: in the absence of the aid, the 
implementation of the project would not have taken place in the area 
concerned or would not have been sufficiently profitable.  
B) in other cases, there must be a significant increase in the scope of the 
project or activity, the total amount spent by the beneficiary and a 
significant reduction in the time frame for completion. 
With regard to tax incentives, the incentive effect will occur if certain 
conditions are met, for example if the measure introduces a right to 
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receive aid on the basis of objective criteria and without the further use 
of discretionary powers of the State; if the measure came into force 
before the start of the project or activity. 
Further conditions are foreseen for regional aid to the operation, for 
those in favour of SMEs to finance, for the employment of 
disadvantaged workers, to compensate for the extra costs related to the 
employment of workers with disabilities, such as remission deriving from 
environmental taxes, to remedy the damage caused by natural disasters, 
for social transport aids for remote areas residents and for culture and 
heritage conservation. 
The new and broader block exemptions should lead to a greater 
accountability, an expression that can indicate both the organizational 
profile and the political address by the Member States in applying the 
guidelines for aids thus “facilitating” support measures for undertakings. 
In this case, the said responsibility would indicate a dual competence, 
shared between the States and the European Union for the purposes of 
greater control and a more accurate monitoring of the measures to help 
businesses. Ultimately, it is an organic/functional set of measures that 
tend to lighten / modernize the work of the Commission, also to direct 
the action of control over the aid of greater consistency and complexity. 
With regard to the ex post examination, the GBER contains certain 
definitive safeguard clauses, that is to guarantee compliance with the 
organic regulatory framework on state aid. 
Firstly, transparency is envisaged – considered as essential for the correct 
application of the Treaty rules – consisting of the obligation to publish 
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information concerning the granting of aid on state and regional websites 
and in the communication of any useful information on both aid 
schemes and individual aid beyond € 500,000 and in the publication 
within 6 months from the date on which the aid was promised or 
endorsed (for fiscal aid, the reference period is extended to one year 
from the declaration date). A transparent aid should also indicate, as 
accurately as possible, the amount of the aid itself in terms of gross ex 
ante grant equivalent in order to allow an estimate of the measure, also to 
exclude it from the obligation to notify, without it being necessary to 
carry out a risk assessment. Thus, for example, in the case of urban 
development aids, the investment must not exceed the threshold of 20 
million euro, as regards the risk financing 15 million euro and for energy 
efficiency projects no higher than 10 millions of euros. A differentiation 
in terms of thresholds is established for the different types of aid to 
undertakings in the start-up phase in the light of article 22, reg. 
651/2014. 
Secondly, the ex post evaluation of the overall aid granted, which will 
concentrate on a series of checks on the actual achievement of the 
objectives set, is addressed to check the potential effects of spill-over and 
the induced benefits, whose non-positive outcome can also lead to the 
revocation of the block exemption.  
These assessments are explicitly envisaged for certain categories of aids, 
for example those deemed more “sensitive” such as regional aids, those 
for small and medium-sized undertakings, research, development and 
innovation, environmental protection and, finally, aids for the 
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implementation of broadband. This assessment can be extended by the 
Commission after the approval of a programme describing the aims of 
the evaluation itself, the result indicators, the methods and the timeline. 
Finally, the monitoring of the approved block exempted schemes is 
carried out, consisting in verifying the existence of aid granted in excess, 
the possible omission of the communication concerning the legal 
conditions of application of the measure, the repeated failure or partial 
application of certain specific rules concerning, for example, the control 
of the effects of the incentive. 
